Interview with Tom Gallagher by Brien Williams by Gallagher, Thomas \u27Tom\u27 D
Bowdoin College 
Bowdoin Digital Commons 
George J. Mitchell Oral History Project Special Collections and Archives 
4-29-2009 
Interview with Tom Gallagher by Brien Williams 
Thomas 'Tom' D. Gallagher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/mitchelloralhistory 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Oral History Commons, Political History Commons, and the 
United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gallagher, Thomas 'Tom' D., "Interview with Tom Gallagher by Brien Williams" (2009). George J. Mitchell 
Oral History Project. 141. 
https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/mitchelloralhistory/141 
This Interview is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections and Archives at Bowdoin 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in George J. Mitchell Oral History Project by an authorized 
administrator of Bowdoin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdoyle@bowdoin.edu. 
  
Page 1 of  19 
George J. Mitchell Oral History Project                              
Bowdoin College Library, 3000 College Sta., Brunswick, Maine 04011    
© Bowdoin College 
 
 
Tom Gallagher GMOH# 093 
(Interviewer: Brien Williams) April 29, 2009 
 
 
Brien Williams:  This is an oral history interview with Thomas D. “Tom” Gallagher, G-A-
L-L-A-G-H-E-R, for the George J. Mitchell Oral History Project at Bowdoin College.  We are in 
the Washington offices of International Strategy and Investment, ISI, where Tom Gallagher is 
senior managing director.  Today is Wednesday, April 29, 2009, and I am Brien Williams. 
 
Tom Gallagher: I was born September 6, 1954, in Redfield, South Dakota; Ray and 
Theresa Gallagher are my parents. 
 
BW:  So give me a little bit of your own personal background, where you went to school and 
so forth, maybe even your parents. 
 
TG: Sure, sure. 
 
BW: What they did and their political leanings, if they had any. 
 
TG: Yeah, actually, coming from a small town in South Dakota, it‟s unusual to end up 
working in Washington, let alone for a senator from Maine.  My father was a lawyer in the small 
town that I grew up in, but he was very active in the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and was actually 
the national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in 1969 and 1970, which is at the 
[peak] of the Vietnam War, so I think that‟s what stimulated the interest in public affairs for just 
about everybody in our family.  All four kids ended up living in Washington, D.C., at one point 
or another, so that‟s kind of interesting. 
 
I went to the University of South Dakota as an undergrad, and went to Harvard, at the Kennedy 
School, got a master‟s in public policy from there.  Came to Washington – Washington‟s a kind 
of „Emerald City‟ if you have a master‟s in public policy – and my first job was at the 
Congressional Research Service as a public finance analyst.  [That] was actually a great job to be 
introduced [to Washington], it was a good transition job from academic work to government 
work, because you had to bring kind of an academic orientation, but you answer questions from 
members of Congress and their staffs on how to approach different issues.  So that got me 
exposure to the issues and to the staff people in the public finance area. 
 
I did that for a year-and-a-half, that would have been the middle of 1978 through January of 
1980, and then I shifted over to work for Senator Muskie on the Senate Budget Committee staff.  
I remember telling my parents that:  “This is a really safe job because, unlike working for an 
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individual senator where your job insecurity comes every six years, I‟m working for the majority 
party and Democrats are never going to lose their majority.”  Of course, that year they lost the 
Senate.  What happened was – they lost the Senate and they lost the White House.  A lot of 
Democratic staff were out looking for jobs, and Senator Muskie during that year had resigned 
and was appointed secretary of state.  George Mitchell was, of course, appointed to replace him.  
He held that Budget Committee position for Muskie, and then switched from the Budget 
Committee to the Finance Committee.   
 
When I was on the Senate Budget Committee staff I did the tax work, and I started at the 
Congressional Research Service doing public finance, really just taxes, and then I did the tax 
work for the Budget Committee, so I had always wanted my next job to be with a Finance 
Committee Democrat.  So [when] all my friends were out looking for work, I actually was very 
lucky to get to move on to what I wanted my next job to be, working for a Finance Committee 
Democrat.  I was very lucky to get the job with Senator Mitchell when he left Budget and went 
on to the Finance Committee.  So anyway, that‟s how I ended up working for George Mitchell. 
 
BW:  When you left Harvard, what did you see as sort of your career path?  Pretty much as it 
unfolded? 
 
TG:  No, not at all.  My wife is also from South Dakota, we met at the University of South 
Dakota, and we thought we‟d spend five years in Washington and head back to the Midwest – 
Minneapolis, Chicago, something like that.  And five years came and went, and here it is thirty, 
coming up on thirty-two years – no, came here in „78, so coming up on thirty-one years here in 
Washington.   
 
I just went for the best job, and for me the best job was this opportunity to do more tax policy 
work at the Congressional Research Service, and then once I got here I guess I thought that I 
would move back and forth between the government and the private sector.  And so I did do that, 
I worked at CRS, then I worked for four years with George Mitchell, then two years at the 
International Trade Commission, and then I went into doing what I do now, which is Wall Street 
research, trying to figure out how Washington affects the financial markets.  And I thought that 
would be a good private sector experience, learning more about the financial markets, preparing 
me to move back into government at some point, and I‟ve just liked it here, it‟s been a good 
career.  So no, I‟m a firm believer in the John Lennon, “life is what happens to you while you‟re 
busy making other plans” line, and so that‟s what‟s happened to me. 
 
BW:  I‟m curious, was the CRS a kind of pipeline to congressional jobs, or what was the 
relationship there professionally? 
 
TG:  That‟s how it turned out for me, and I think it did for some other people, too.  I think that 
CRS at the time, it‟s self-flattering to say this, but I think it was a great place for self-starters.  
And then if you were ambitious, you could do a lot of interesting research in areas and you could 
meet your counterparts in the congressional staffs, whether it‟s in the individual members‟ 
offices or in the committees.  And as it turns out, a lot of people actually stayed at CRS, even 
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thirty years later some of the people I worked with are still there, [taking the professional route 
you mention].  So it‟s not always that kind of a pipeline, but that‟s how it worked for me and for 
some others. So actually there‟s a pretty clear line running through my first few jobs, of doing 
tax work on Capitol Hill. 
 
BW:  And when you went to Budget, were you on the senator‟s payroll, or were you on the 
committee‟s payroll? 
 
TG:  I was on the committee payroll.  They had a majority and a minority staff; I worked for 
the majority staff.  The staff director of course hired by the chairman of the committee, and so 
almost all of our work was done for the chairman.   
 
The Budget Committee staff, it‟s interesting actually, back then – it hasn‟t really played out so 
much since then – but a lot of the early Budget Committee chairmen at one point ran for 
president.  I think one of the reasons is, is you actually have a pretty good staff base to cover all 
the issues for you, because you have staff that cover every function of the budget.  You had 
Muskie run for president; Hollings took his place, he ran for president.  Even on the House side, 
I think one or two of the Budget Committee chairmen either talked about it or actually did do it.  
So it‟s just kind of an interesting phenomenon.  John [Richard] Kasich, I guess, had done it on 
the Republican side.  It gives you an exposure to the issues; it gives you a national perspective.  
So I worked for Muskie, but it was all in his capacity as committee chairman, there was no home 
state work at all. 
 
BW:  So when did you first become aware of George Mitchell? 
 
TG:  When he filled Muskie‟s seat on the committee and, again, since most of my work was 
for the chairman, my work shifted from Muskie to Hollings, and so he was a member of the 
committee and I had some exposure to him then.  But it really was after the election, when „most 
everybody on the committee were told, “You‟re probably going to have to find another job,” 
because the committee staff, when you go from majority to minority shrinks a lot, and I was part 
of the economics team.  There was a chief economist, two other economists and myself, and they 
were going to replace the four of us with one, and so we were all looking for work. 
 
And then I read in one of the rags that George Mitchell had moved from the Budget Committee 
to the Finance Committee and I thought, “Well this is what I wanted to do anyway.”  So I went 
in to the staff director, John McEvoy, and I told him that I‟d like to apply for that.  And he just 
turned around and picked up the phone and called Senator Mitchell‟s administrative assistant and 
he said, “I‟ve got a great guy for you for your Finance Committee position.  He‟s been working 
for me for four or five years, he‟s got a Ph.D. in economics, da-da-da-da-da-da,” then he hung up 
the phone.  And I said, “Well thanks.”  He says, “You got an interview this afternoon.”  And I 
said, “Well thanks, but I haven‟t worked for you for four or five years, I worked for you for one 
year, I don‟t have a Ph.D., I have a master‟s.”  And I still remember what he said, he just said, 
“No charge.”  So I had the interview and started working for him, I don‟t remember if it was 
January or February of [‟81]. 
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BW:  Of „81. 
 
TG:  Yeah, I‟m sorry, „81, I‟m fast forwarding.  
 
BW:  You‟re ahead of yourself. 
 
TG:  Exactly, probably January of „81. 
 
BW:  And who was the AA at that time? 
 
TG:  Well, Case was his last name, was it Jim Case?  [ ] I forget, but he‟s the one that I 
initially interviewed with, but then David Johnson took over as the AA before any decisions 
were made, so he‟s the one that really did the hiring.  I think I first interviewed with Case, and 
then actually interviewed with David again and was hired by David. 
 
BW:  And at what point did you meet the senator? 
 
TG:  You know, my memory‟s not that good.  I imagine that I had a meeting with him - 
 
BW:  But you never went through a job interview with him? 
 
TG:  I assume that I did, but I just don‟t remember it that clearly.  Most of it was with the AA.  
And I know they wouldn‟t have hired me if I hadn‟t met him, but that doesn‟t stick with me. 
 
BW:  Do you know anything about how Senator Mitchell maneuvered himself from Budget to 
Finance? 
 
TG:  No, all that happened before I got there, so I was really focused on thinking about how I 
staff somebody who‟s already on the Finance Committee.  I‟m not familiar with that.   
 
BW: And in terms – 
 
TG: It doesn‟t surprise me, because I don‟t think the Budget Committee offers a lot of 
political benefits.  I mean mainly, you‟ve got to make a lot of tough decisions.  It‟s interesting, 
that‟s why the Budget Committee tends to attract people who are more fiscal conservatives or 
within their respective parties, they are drawn to want to make those decisions.  Most people 
would rather be in a committee that actually doles out the money, either through appropriations 
or through taxes through the Finance Committee.  So, not surprising that he didn‟t stay on that, 
especially given that he was going to have a tough election in „82.   
 
At that stage, the record of appointed senators was a very poor one.  It‟s improved a little bit 
since then, but it‟s still very iffy.  I think the last like three or four appointed senators had all 
been defeated either in a primary or in a general election, so I think he had to be focused on what 
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would help him get reelected.  But again, all that happened before I got there. 
 
BW:  Yeah.  He described himself as “senator with an asterisk,” for those first two years. 
 
TG:  That‟s a good one, yeah. 
 
BW:  Now it‟s curious, because you say that Appropriations is sort of strategically a better 
position to be in than Budget, and yet the Budget people are the ones that were running for 
president. 
 
TG:  The chairmen were.  I think it‟s good to be a chairman, but even then, if I remember 
right, when Hollings had the seniority to become the Commerce Committee chairman, he did 
switch from Budget to Commerce.  So again, it‟s a little bit more of a hands-on, actually 
authorizing legislation that comes before you, actual programs to influence, so it‟s -   I agree, I 
agree with you, but they don‟t have trouble filling the Budget Committee assignments, but I‟m 
not surprised that someone who was looking at a tough election would opt for a different 
committee assignment. 
 
BW:  Before we get into the economic matters, what was George Mitchell like as a boss? 
 
TG:  Oh, he was actually very easy to staff, because he was just so smart and a quick study.  I 
think the fact that he had been both a judge and a prosecutor helped him a lot in the areas where I 
saw him, which was in the committee and on the Senate floor.  I actually think compared to most 
other senators he relied on staff [much] less.  It‟s just an impression that I developed over the 
years – in part because, he was a staff member himself, right, having worked for Muskie, and so, 
I don‟t know, I found it, comparing notes with other staff people (and I became very good 
friends with people who had my job for the other Finance Committee members).  There were 
either eighteen or twenty Finance Committee members at the time, and I just felt it was easier to 
do because he was a smart guy. 
 
Here‟s just one example, one of the things that the staff members had to do after a debate on the 
Senate floor that their member participated in:  you were expected to go and correct the record, 
the air quotes around “correct the record,” this was always kind of a quiet thing.  Every few years 
somebody like Reader’s Digest would expose the scandal that the Congressional Record isn‟t 
really the verbatim record of what was said on the Senate floor.  And I remember some of the 
staff [would] go into the room where they had the transcript and you‟d review it, and some of 
these staff people were like, “Okay, here‟s the start of the sentence on page forty-seven, I think 
he ended it here on page fifty-three, if we just kind of move these together and block this out…”  
It was horrible work for some people whose bosses weren‟t as articulate as Senator Mitchell was.  
I just stopped doing this for Senator Mitchell, because I never had to make any changes.  Not 
only did he speak in complete sentences, but he spoke in well-ordered paragraphs, and again, I 
think his previous experience helped him in that.   
 
I don‟t know if he ever knew that I stopped doing it.  But these tax bills, [p/o] because every 
  
Page 6 of  19 
senator would have an amendment when a tax bill came on the Senate floor, the solution was 
always just to stay in until two or four in the morning just to tire everybody out, to stop offering 
the amendments or to accept a compromise that the staff had negotiated.  We always were very 
late, so if the debate ended at three in the morning, [p/o] if your boss spoke toward the end, 
you‟d have to go correct the record.  And I never had to make [ ]changes. 
 
BW:  That‟s neat. 
 
TG:  So that‟s just an observation.  He was a relatively easy guy to staff. 
 
BW:  What kind of a modus operandi did you develop with him? 
 
TG:  Well I think, because we had a small staff, because he was a junior senator and in the 
minority party, it was pretty informal; it was always easy to go in and ask him questions when 
you needed to.  You‟d go through the channels, but we had a lot of face time with the senator, if 
you will.  So I just remember it being more informal than anything else.  I‟m sure I‟d do some 
memos for him, but there was a lot of face-to-face time.  That‟s when we had to answer 
questions.  He had obviously meetings throughout the day.  If it was a meeting that affected me, 
like if somebody was making a pitch on a bill before the committee or somebody was visiting 
from Maine and they had an interest in some legislation, I‟d staff that meeting.  So anyway, a lot 
of face time, but nothing comes to mind when you say, “What kind of MO did we develop?” 
 
BW:  Well I guess one thing I was curious [about], in what percentage of the times was he 
making assignments for you – “Look into this, look into that,” – and how often were you doing 
sort of the opposite:  “I think, Senator, this is worth your attention.” 
 
TG:  Well, I think the answer is both of those things.  If something came across him in his 
meetings that I wasn‟t a part of, other senators or people from Maine, when he was back in 
Maine, he would assemble tasks for all of us to do and either would come to us directly, he‟d 
want to explain it to us directly, or it would come through the AA.  So there was a lot of that, but 
then there was also, “Okay, you‟re the Finance Committee staff guy, help the Senator out.” 
 
I remember in particular one time we put together a bill on alternative energy tax credits, because 
that‟s an important issue for Maine.  So it was a bit of an opportunity to be kind of an 
entrepreneur, in that sense, kind of develop an area, present it to the AA, present it to the 
Senator, and you go back and forth on it.  Ultimately it would probably end up being a bill that 
was introduced where there‟d be a speech on the Senate floor to accompany it, or possibly an 
amendment in committee or that sort of thing.   
 
That was kind of my job, to look for opportunities and to respond to the projects that he 
developed.  And economics really wasn‟t his strong suit, so I probably had more freedom to 
roam in that area.  Obviously, being the lawyer and the judge that he was, he was more drawn to 
those kinds of issues and foreign policy issues, and kind of less drawn to the core economic 
issues that came before the Finance Committee. 
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Social Security was another issue that went through the Finance Committee, and that was one 
that he took more of a personal interest in, because you also had President Reagan‟s Social 
Security reform proposals that he came out with, in the first six months of his term, I don‟t 
remember exactly when it was, but that became a big issue for Senator Mitchell, and for most 
Democrats, in the run-up to the „82 mid-term elections. 
 
BW:  You said a moment ago, when Maine people came to town, that you would staff 
meetings.  What does that exactly mean? 
 
TG:  To the extent they identified what their interests were in advance, I imagine I did a 
memo – I just don‟t remember – a memo to the Senator before the meeting so that it would say 
what the issue was, what the status of the bill was, remind him if he‟d taken a position or had co-
sponsored a bill or something like that.  That sort of thing, just to give him background so that 
the meeting would be productive, not just learning about the issue during the meeting but where 
he had some knowledge of it beforehand. 
 
BW:  But he would be the main participant in the meeting. 
 
TG:  Yeah.  Sometimes, where there was a well established relationship, somebody from 
Maine might just set up a meeting with me or some other staff person on an issue, where they 
would save their face time with Senator Mitchell for really important things. 
 
BW:  And how did you come up to speed on particular Maine issues? 
 
TG:  I relied a lot on the staff that worked for Senator Mitchell in the state; I did make some 
visits there as a staff member.  So I just applied myself and I guess I relied on the people whose 
job it was really to look at it.  That was another filter for projects, too.  Senator Mitchell had a 
few offices in the state of Maine, and they did a lot of constituent work.  Either constituents 
would come to their offices, or they would attend meetings and that sort of thing, and so we 
worked really closely with them. 
 
BW:  And during the time you were there, you were the finance guy, is that correct? 
 
TG:  That‟s right, that‟s right.  Later we broke that up, because the Finance Committee has 
really all of the revenues in the federal budget, that is:  taxes, tariffs, even borrowing and then 
something like half or more of the spending side, because it had Social Security, it had Medicare, 
it had Medicaid, I think it had some other things, interest on the debt.  I mean it was a budget 
committee in its own right.  There was a lot of work there, so at some point, I know that we 
moved some of the spending programs over to another staff person. 
 
BW:  Who was chairman of Finance during that time? 
 
TG:  Dole was the chairman.  And I assume that was for the entire four years while I was 
  
Page 8 of  19 
there.  Yeah, I‟m sure it was. 
 
BW:  Any thoughts about working with him on the other side? 
 
TG:  Well I tell you, I think that they kind of butted heads a few times, in my day.  Obviously 
they became fast friends as Democratic and Republican leaders later on, and I don‟t think there 
was any animosity then, but Dole ran the committee in a pretty partisan way.  Well, I shouldn‟t 
say, let me kind of rephrase that.  A lot of the bills that went through the committee ended up on 
a party-line vote.  And Dole is a pretty aggressive partisan in that sense, and since Mitchell was a 
vulnerable member, I think that naturally led to some clashes, but again, not on a personal level.  
It just kind of, that was politics.  And obviously it wasn‟t very deep because, as I say, they 
became pretty good friends and had a lot of mutual respect for each other when they were both 
their leaders. 
 
BW:  And who was ranking? 
 
TG:  Russell Long, and then Lloyd Bentsen.  I think, did Long retire after ‟82 [sic:  January 
1987]?  
 
BW: I‟m not going to have that –  
 
TG:  I should remember that, because I‟m pretty sure I dealt with both Long and Bentsen as 
the ranking member, but maybe it was Long the entire time.  This is a long time ago, Brien. 
 
BW:  And there are no grades on this test, I think. 
 
TG:  That‟s good. 
 
BW:  I‟ve asked you about George Mitchell as a boss.  What about the sort of personal – was 
George Mitchell a friend kind of aspect of your relationship with him? 
 
TG:  Well, I‟ll say this, I think that he treated the staff very well, and I think that in part might 
have, I mean that was just his personality, but also, that was not Senator Muskie‟s reputation; he 
could be kind of tough on staff.  So maybe he [Mitchell] had a reaction to that, so he was very 
understanding.  I liked to staff when a bill was on the Senate floor late into the night or early into 
the morning, it was fun to be on the Senate floor and all that, but he would say, “If you need to 
go, go home.”  He kind of saw what the amendments were for the rest of the night and he was 
respectful of your personal side.   
 
But I wouldn‟t say that, we weren‟t friends in that sense, because I don‟t think you should be, I 
don‟t think a senator really should be.  Maybe with the AA, that‟s a relationship that would 
develop, but I wouldn‟t have said that we developed as friends.  It was a very positive and 
productive relationship and that sort of thing, but I wasn‟t going to come in and put my feet up 
on the table and crack a beer with him. 
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BW:  It wasn‟t a first-name basis? 
 
TG:  Well, the joke was that everybody had the same first name there, it was “Senator,” so we 
never, I mean other senators did go by their first name, but that was never the case in our office, 
at least not with me. 
 
BW:  Were there party times at all, or was that pretty much not on the agenda? 
 
TG:  It would be, like on somebody‟s birthday, something like that would happen, and if he 
were there it would happen, it would happen in his office, and if he were there he would attend.   
 
BW:  Now, Muskie‟s presence sort of probably loomed over the office to a fair extent because 
so many of the people Mitchell hired were Muskie folks to begin with, right? 
 
TG:  Yeah, although I wouldn‟t overstate that.  I think for one thing Mitchell was a very 
disciplined guy, and so we quickly had a lot of focus on what needed to be done for him to be a 
good senator and then to get elected in „82.  And so part of it was, Muskie was strong on the 
environment and so it was only natural that a Maine Democrat would also be strong on that.  So 
Charlene Sturbitts, whom you‟re talking to, did a terrific job on the acid rain issue, really 
developed an issue that he was identified with exclusively and pushed that.   
 
But at the same time, Muskie was known for being rather aloof and not going back to the state 
often.  Mitchell started in the Senate in maybe May of ‟80?  Somewhere around there.  And then 
the Democrats were devastated in the Senate elections, along with Carter losing in a landslide to 
Reagan, and Mitchell, I think, really studied that.  And one conclusion that stood out above all 
the others was:  you‟ve got to spend a lot of time in the state.  So that was a contrast with Muskie 
that he developed very much to his benefit, and never let up after he was elected in „82.  It wasn‟t 
going to be [that] he was only going to come every sixth year. 
 
BW:  Did you notice -? 
 
TG:  Here‟s a story for you.  He really was a modest guy.  After the „82 election, so he was 
elected, [ ] and back then there weren‟t direct flights, or at least most of the time he had to 
change planes in Boston to get to Portland.  I don‟t know if there are direct flights now, but 
anyway, he had to change planes there.  And so after the lame duck session in „82 he went home 
for the holidays, went to the Boston airport and went to the Delta lounge, I think it was Delta, 
maybe I‟ve got it wrong but I think it was the Delta lounge, and they turned him away.  They 
said, “This is for VIPs only.”  They just didn‟t know who he was, and he was not the kind of guy 
to say, “But I‟m a U.S. senator,” so he just left.  And then I think somebody pointed out, “You 
just kicked out a U.S. senator,” so they paged him at the airport but he never responded to the 
page.  So they called our office and said, “Do you know where your senator is?  We just kicked 
him out of our lounge.”   
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Anyway, I don‟t know if they ultimately got him, but taxation of fringe benefits was an 
important issue for airlines, and it went through the Finance Committee.  The lobbyist for the 
airline in January came in, presented Mitchell with this bigger than life size, lifetime admission 
to their Delta VIP lounges so that this would never happen again.  Anyway, it was a funny story, 
and I always thought, “Well, maybe he did it just for the story value too,” but he was not the kind 
of guy to say, “You have to let me in, I‟m a VIP.” 
 
BW:  And that leads to another question.  Some senators kind of carry an aura with them:  „I‟m 
impressive‟ and so forth.  Did Mitchell fall into that category or-? 
 
TG:  Well, he did.  I think he reminded a lot of people of being the judge.  He was a judge, he 
was only a judge for like a year, maybe less than a year, but I think he had that kind of a 
demeanor to him so that was a way different people have, different personas can develop that 
aura, but I think that‟s what served him well.  And this is a thing to talk to the staffers who 
worked for him when he was majority leader, they can answer it better, but I always thought that 
he understood the changes in the institution and realized that one of the keys to being a strong 
leader is to be a good listener, and I think that was a real source of his success in moving up. 
 
BW:  So did you notice any sort of behavioral changes in „83, when he came back in as a full 
fledged senator? 
 
TG:  Ha.  You know, maybe a little more relaxed, but you‟ve talked to David Johnson? 
 
BW:  Not yet. 
 
TG:  He had a story, in the car with Senator Mitchell in December of „82, where they‟re 
having a conversation and David said, “I‟m really looking forward now to working for a senator 
who‟s not up for reelection.”  And Senator Mitchell said, “You [still] are.  It‟s just a little further 
away.”  To loop back to the earlier point, he was not going to lose sight of the fact that you‟re 
not going to abandon the state but you‟re going to maintain a high level of exposure in the state, 
go back a lot, see as much of the state as you can.  So I‟d say that we were a little more relaxed.   
 
Just to talk about the election, as I‟m sure he told you, [ ] in May of „81 a poll came out showing 
[Mitchell] losing to his ultimate opponent by like thirty-two points, so that made people pretty 
nervous in the office.  And I think every poll taken after that was just a steady improvement, and 
he ended up winning by twenty-one – I may be wrong, off by a point or two in those.  So it was 
actually a pretty good experience, because you just felt the sense of momentum and everything.  
It wasn‟t exactly a cliffhanger on election night, and so maybe the tension had let up a little bit 
prior to that.  I think there was just a little bit of a more relaxed attitude in the office, but I don‟t 
remember a real change in demeanor on his part.  He was just determined to kind of move on to 
whatever was ahead. 
 
BW:  Of course he‟d also had that experience of not winning the governorship, in „74 I think it 
was, so he knew what defeat was like. 
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TG:  Yeah, that‟s a good point.  I think politicians who have experienced defeat probably 
learn more from that than they [ ] learn from victories. 
 
BW:  So during the campaign in „82, were the staff people in the state, or were you all still 
working down here, or a bit of both? 
 
TG:  Yeah, I think we stayed there.  I know I took vacation time at the very end to go up and 
work, but I don‟t know if that was even for a week, maybe do a little door-to-door kind of thing 
or something like that, but we were there.  When I say we, other staff people, and my wife was 
with me too, we were there.  And on election night, because I remember I was the one who 
caught his opponent on TV, just hearing him make the statement, so I was like the only one who 
happened to be listening to the TV because everybody was partying or celebrating.  So I had to 
go in and talk to Senator Mitchell, “Now what exactly did David Emery say?  Did he concede?” 
was the question, because everybody else is celebrating with Mitchell, they just couldn‟t have 
been more matter-of-fact about it.  I remember him saying, “Well I don‟t want to go out and 
declare victory if it turns out I‟m going to lose.”  So he was very practical about it, not getting 
carried away with the emotion of the moment. 
 
BW:  But none of you were really biting your fingernails on that election night. 
 
TG:  Well no.  Remember, it was a very big night for Democrats.  The recession really had 
started, I want to say in July of „81, and they ultimately declared the end of it as November of 
‟82.  So we had a poor economy which always works to the detriment of the party in power, and 
that‟s why you could have a fifty-three-point swing in the race.  It was never going to be a thirty-
point race anyway, but Mitchell played it well and actually ended up having a pretty good wind 
at his back. 
 
BW:  Do you recall anything about his election speech? 
 
TG:  No, I don‟t. 
 
BW:  Was it jubilant, or rabble-rousing, or was the judge at work? 
 
TG:  Well no, he wasn‟t reading a brief, legal brief or anything like that.  I just, that‟s too long 
ago. 
 
BW:  Let‟s turn to the economic issues of that time, because that was Sturm und Drang really, 
with Reagan coming in and David Stockman and - 
 
TG:  It‟s funny you mention that.  Yes, I remember David Stockman having the famous 
economic Dunkirk memo, probably, I was waiting for somebody to make reference to that this 
time around, right, because this election last year was in many ways the mirror image of the 1980 
election.  In fact, what I do for a living here, my tag line was that „08 was the reverse of „80, 
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using numerology to make the point that the 1980 election accelerated the drive towards smaller 
government, and the economic troubles were a launch pad for that, and in the same way, „08 has 
accelerated a drive toward a more activist government, but I think Dunkirk doesn‟t resonate as 
much with voters today as it did in 1980 and „81. 
 
But yeah, economic issues were front and center.  There were the budget cuts, the tax cuts that 
were developed in separate pieces of legislation, I mentioned Social Security reform.  And then 
starting in „82, Senator Dole took it upon himself to address the deficit with a series of tax 
increase bills, „82, „83, „84, that he was determined to try to close the budget gap, to play the role 
of the fiscally responsible moderate Republican, much to the chagrin of some of the diehard 
Reagan supporters at the time.  I remember somebody, gosh, this was after the „80 election 
where some [conservative] came in saying, “Yeah, we‟re going to shoot all the liberals, starting 
with Bob Dole,” so he was actually being very fiscally responsible.  So that meant that the 
Finance Committee just had a lot of things. 
 
We also had trade issues, trade policy issues, that‟s really when the trade deficit started to widen 
a lot.  And Maine had, I remember a standard part of the speech was, “Maine – comma – the 
leading footwear producing state in the nation – comma,” [I] had like one button on the word 
processor that I could punch and that whole phrase would pop up.  Potatoes were another issue.  
So there were a lot of trade issues.  And then banking was another issue at the time.  So yeah, 
there were a lot of economic issues in the four years that I worked there. 
 
BW:  Did you come in before ERTA? 
 
TG:  Now, that was the tax cut, ERTA was – 
 
BW: In ‟81. 
 
TG:  - the Reagan tax cut in „81, yeah. 
 
BW:  And what was Mitchell‟s position on that? 
 
TG:  Well, he voted to make many changes in it, but ultimately voted for it.  I assume he 
voted for the spending cuts, too.  I don‟t know that for a fact, I just don‟t remember that he did, 
but you had bracket creep back then, which was pretty famous for pushing people into higher tax 
brackets and raising more revenue, so you had to return, I mean taxes were too high and you had 
a recession, so it was important to have a tax cut.  And he voted to make a lot of changes in it, 
but ultimately voted for it. 
 
BW:  Were some Democrats on the Finance Committee dug in and opposing this, or did 
everyone sort of go along? 
 
TG:  No, I‟m sure that there was, if my memory serves me, Democrats might have been about 
split on that issue.   
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BW:  And then it‟s my understanding that TEFRA in „82 sort of - 
 
TG:  You‟re good with your memory, or your research is good.   
 
BW: Yeah, I‟ve - 
 
TG: My favorite back then was FIRPTA, Foreign Investment and Real Property Tax Act.  
But, yes. 
 
BW:  So TEFRA was, took some corrective action, is that -? 
 
TG:  That was the start of the Dole tax increases in „82, and that one, if I remember, was very 
much on party lines.  I‟m not sure that there were many Democrats – if there were a handful I‟d 
be surprised – that supported that.  And I think it was partly, Dole was a pretty partisan guy and 
so there might have been a way to elicit support among Democrats for that, but it just didn‟t 
materialize.  I‟m wondering if Bradley, Bill Bradley might have supported it.  Bradley I think 
was, Mitchell being the junior guy was at the end of the dais, and I think Bradley was the next 
most junior, so I‟m pretty sure they were next to each other and they were both really smart and 
so they had a lot of conversations on issues.  But I think he might have voted for it, I‟m not sure.  
But for the most part, Democrats were not participating in that process. 
 
BW:  And what their reluctance to participate in that? 
 
TG:  Well, like I say, maybe because I worked on the staff, but I don‟t think it was run in a 
particularly bipartisan way.  But then also they were tax increases, and it was „82, the recession 
was still on, but that‟s just my recollection; I‟d have to go back.  And there were substantive 
differences on the elements in there as well.  But again, it‟s a long time ago. 
 
BW:  But I think one of the things you are saying is that personality and the management of 
people had a role to play. 
 
TG:  Most definitely, that‟s what you see in the committee process is the personality 
interactions. 
 
BW:  Talk about that for a moment. 
 
TG:  Well I was kind of alluding to it earlier, with Senator Dole.  Senator Long was very 
helpful with Senator Mitchell.   I think a couple times his staff might have suggested, “Here‟s an 
issue; that‟s an issue; that you might want to look at.”  I mean they had a good relationship, as 
Senator Mitchell worked well with the other senators.  I‟m trying to think if there‟s anybody that 
he really didn‟t get along with and it doesn‟t come to mind. 
 
BW:  Having Russell Long as a mentor is a good sign, isn‟t it? 
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TG:  Yes, and I‟m trying to remember more about that relationship.  I just remember it was a 
positive one; Long I think probably did more than he had to, to look after Senator Mitchell.  But 
I don‟t remember much about it at a personal level, all of my dealings were more at a staff level, 
and a lot of times if there was a meeting among members [where] the staff were not present. 
 
BW:  Were there, this is just sort of a sideline here, but were there other senators that took 
George Mitchell under their wing? 
 
TG:  I imagine that Mitchell cultivated good relationships with most of them, so I don‟t 
remember any in particular that you‟d say were looking after him.  Like I say, I think Bradley 
and he were pretty good friends, but that was at a peer-to-peer level, not somebody really looking 
after him.  It doesn‟t come to mind. 
 
BW:  Now, as a South Dakotan, you probably know when Tom Daschle arrived in the Senate. 
 
TG:  Yes, it‟s actually kind of funny that I remember, it was hard to staff a state that you 
weren‟t familiar with, and I thought, “Man, it would be great if there was ever a Finance 
Committee Democrat from South Dakota,” but I thought, “that‟s not going to happen.”  And then 
Daschle wins the Senate in „86 and immediately gets on the Finance Committee, because he and 
Mitchell were actually very good friends and allies.  So I was just a couple years off. 
 
BW:  You‟ve mentioned the Social Security, and that was Greenspan and Moynihan and that 
whole, isn‟t that the cast of characters on that? 
 
TG:  Well, that was the fix, which I‟m pretty sure Mitchell voted for, but Reagan made it quite 
controversial in, I want to say May or June of, well, maybe a little later than that, maybe it was 
the fall of „81, but he made a pretty controversial set of proposals to cut back on Social Security.  
And it was seen as part of the whole conservative agenda to try to cut back on that and maybe 
take advantage of the looming financial crisis to try to advance the conservative agenda, much 
the same way that Obama now is being accused of using the crisis to advance your ideological 
agenda – and my comment on that is, it‟s always been that way.   
 
So it became very controversial and very partisan, and then the fix came about in „82.  I assume 
it passed in early „83, because if I remember right, Moynihan revived this commission after the 
election and so they got the Social Security fix passed weeks before Social Security was about to 
go under.  So when I refer to the Social Security issue my first thought is how controversial it 
was in „81, and then you had the fix in late „82 and early „83 that really held the system together 
for a pretty long time.  Everybody wants to set up bipartisan commissions to fix things; that‟s 
probably the last one that really worked.   
 
BW:  And that‟s the one where they all retired to Andrews, right? 
 
TG:  No, that would have been in, I believe in „91, which Mitchell was still a part of.  The 
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Andrews Air Force Base negotiations were the budget talks for the tax increase in „90, that 
would have been probably 1990. 
 
BW:  I think, though, on the Social Security they all holed up somewhere. 
 
TG:  Okay, it could have been, I don‟t remember. 
 
BW:  And I guess Gramm-Rudman happened after you had left the Senator‟s service. 
 
TG:  Yes, I think that started around „86 or something like that. 
 
BW:  „Eighty-five, „86, right. 
 
TG:  I remember one of the reasons I was glad to get out when I did was that it was clear that, 
I don‟t know why it was clear, but it seemed to me that tax reform was on the horizon as an 
issue.  And everybody else who did the work that I did, everybody else who had the same job for 
other Finance Committee members was a lawyer, maybe there was one [other] exception, and I 
wasn‟t a lawyer, and I was decided I didn‟t really want to get channeled into tax policy, so I 
started to branch out.  I was doing more work in the trade area and I had my sights on working at 
the International Trade Commission.  There was a Democrat who was heading it and so I saw a 
chance to broaden there, and so I didn‟t really want to do tax reform.   
 
And then that became an issue because Mondale campaigning in „84 saying, “I‟m going to raise 
your taxes; the difference is I‟m going to tell you now.”  And so Reagan kind of said, “I‟m not 
going to raise your taxes; I‟m going to reform them.”  That was the dynamic, so he had to follow 
through on that, but I was glad to get out before all that happened.   
 
BW:  Any vivid memories of Mitchell on finance issues during that period? 
 
TG:  Well, the honest answer to that is, I don‟t have many vivid memories, twenty-five years 
old, that are twenty-five years old.  I mean, I‟ve given you some of the main things that came 
across to me. 
 
BW:  Did he ever show exasperation at Ronald Reagan and Reagan‟s economic policies? 
 
TG:  Well, he did.  Exasperation is probably about the right word.  It wasn‟t anger or outrage, 
but I know he felt that the dynamic that had developed where [Republicans were irresponsible on 
deficits and wanted Democrats to push for higher taxes to compensate for that].  I saw the seeds 
of what happened in 1990 in his opinion in the early „80s, when he thought that Democrats 
should not be lured into these tax increases [ ], I think was in Stockman‟s memoirs.  Stockman 
said that he and Darman were having a conversation at the White House as this bill is going to 
conference, and they said, “The out-year deficits are really big, do we try to change it now or fix 
it later?”  And I think Darman said, “We‟ll fix it later.”   
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And his whole philosophy then became to get a tax increase by Immaculate Conception; you get 
all the negotiators in the room and they all come out and agree to a tax increase.  And Mitchell 
saw that as being very irresponsible, they were asking Democrats to bail Reagan out of his 
policies.  And so he resisted that dynamic, he didn‟t want Democrats to be set up as the tax 
increasers, when all these Republicans knew that it had to happen, they were just hoping 
Democrats would play along.  And so he didn‟t like that, and clearly that was the name of the 
game in 1990, when budget negotiations took place where Mitchell kept insisting that the White 
House go on record calling for tax increases. 
 
BW:  Did you have good or strained relations with staff members of the Republicans? 
 
TG:  They were more partisan than Dole was, many of his staff people were.  „Strained 
relations‟ wouldn‟t be the right word, they were pretty intent on getting things done for their 
boss, but I wouldn‟t say strained.  We ultimately did what we had to do, but the cooperation was 
much more on the Democratic side.  [Among personal staff, as opposed to committee staff, there 
were good relations all around]. 
 
BW:  Just a few quick ones here.  Was Mitchell for a balanced budget amendment, or not? 
 
TG:  Well gosh, I don‟t think that he was.  I don‟t remember that being a real major issue 
then, I think it became a bigger issue after I left. 
 
BW:  Right, right, and I guess the line item veto - 
 
TG:  I don‟t remember that.  Tax reform I remember as a bigger issue which Mitchell 
embraced, partly because of his friendship with Bradley, partly because it was a better alternative 
than these kind of incremental tax increases that Dole was advocating at the time.  So he actually 
ended up having his own version of a tax reform bill that was modeled on what Bradley had 
done. 
 
BW:  So I guess you explained to me already what prompted your leaving Senator Mitchell‟s 
office, right, you took aim on trade and so forth. 
 
TG:  Yeah, and I was working on trade issues working for Senator Mitchell; I liked it a lot.  
And the International Trade Commission is an independent agency with six commissioners, three 
each from each party, and they rotate the chairmanship every two years.  And so there was a 
Democrat who was about to chair the commission, and she had like one Schedule C 
appointment, which is a political appointment, and so I was offered that and it was just a chance 
to move into another area, get a little experience somewhere else in government.   
 
Working on a member‟s staff can tire you out.  I had done both, the committee staff and the 
member staff, and the committee staff is a little easier in the sense that you don‟t have the home 
state issues to work on.  And so I was getting tired of almost four years of that and I was ready to 
move on. 
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BW:  Did Senator Mitchell play a role in your getting the job at the trade -? 
 
TG:  No, no, just one thing I remember is that the International Trade Commission had a case 
on footwear imports, which again, [was the] „leading footwear producing state in the nation,‟ and 
so I made the switch just weeks before they made their decision on this.  The timing was good, 
because to almost everyone on the outside‟s surprise, the ITC rejected the request for protection 
– Mitchell was pretty upset, but then they actually had a second case and reversed it.  But no, he 
didn‟t have anything, he wished me well, and I stayed in touch with him over the years.   
 
In many ways for me, even though that was my third job in Washington, [working for Senator 
Mitchell] was my most consequential one, because that‟s how I learned how a bill becomes a 
law.  To work for a member is to understand how they decide how they vote on issues, and you 
see how bills move through Congress.  For me it was, even though I‟d say that most people in 
town would say, “You‟d rather have a committee job than a member job?”  That was my liftoff 
job, working for him.   
 
And so I‟ve just tried to repay, although I remember Mitchell had a lot of jokes about how we all 
were paid in „psychic remuneration,‟ which is to say, I remember telling him if I had a psychic 
mortgage, that would be helpful. 
 
BW:  What about a psychic marriage, what effect does working for a member have on married 
life? 
 
TG:  Well, it was demanding, but frankly [while] I didn‟t think it would be true, I think my 
job here working for a Wall Street research firm has actually been more intense.  The Hill jobs 
have a lot of peaks and valleys, the peaks, yeah, [they were intense].  I don‟t have any nights 
where I‟m working till two or four in the morning, but during congressional recesses, that was 
the valley in terms of activity level.  You could really put your feet up and relax a bit then.  So I 
don‟t have any, my wife got to know Senator Mitchell and he was gracious to her and she felt 
like part of the family, and that sort of thing.  So no, I don‟t feel that was at all a negative. 
 




BW:  - things outside of Congress.  So what would you say was George Mitchell‟s role in 
history, during the period when you were working with him? 
 
TG:  Well remember, I worked for him when he was the most junior member of the minority 
party, so I guess I was there during the formative years for him in the Senate.  I told you before 
you turned the recorder on, I always joke that his rise to national prominence seemed to coincide 
with my departure from his staff.  So I enjoyed watching him, I stayed in touch with him a little 
bit when he went on to be the leader and did such an effective job.  And in fact I wonder how 
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much, I don‟t know how much you talked to him about his presidential interest, because I 
remember in „92, „91, after the Gulf War, Mitchell was among those leading Democrats who 
said, “I‟m not going to run in „92,” thinking that Bush was the likely winner.  In fact, I pretty 
much remember a public statement where Mitchell said, “I‟m not going to run in „92, but you 
can pencil me in for „96,” or something like, “I‟m going to think hard about it for „96.”  And then 
of course when Clinton won in „92, I suspect that accelerated his thought process on leaving the 
Senate. 
 
BW:  When he was elected majority leader in „88 I guess, going into „89, was that a surprise to 
you, or could you see in the junior senator from Maine the makings of a potential leader? 
 
TG:  I didn‟t think about it at the time.  I wouldn‟t say that that was a source of conversation 
at all in the office, that that was his aspiration.  Of course through „82 the only goal was to get 
reelected, and then I think he probably started to build that.  When was he the Democrat Senate 
Campaign Committee chairman, was that „86 to „88? 
 
BW:  It was „85-‟86. 
 
TG: Right, right. 
 
BW: Or „87, „85-„87, for the „86 elections, which - 
 
TG:  For the „86 election, yeah, so I would think of it as the „85-„86, I mean that was a sign, 
people who take that job are usually looking for leadership positions, so that was a sign.  I never 
saw that as the goal, but I certainly saw the personal qualities that could lead to his climbing the 
leadership ladder. 
 
BW:  When‟s your last contact with him? 
 
TG:  It was probably a couple years ago, he called me up, because I‟d been contributing to the 
Mitchell Institute.  When they set it up a lot of the former staff people made some commitments 
to it, so he called me up to thank me, which was very nice.  We had a short conversation about 
hiking, that‟s all I remember about it; we had just come back from a hiking vacation.  But no, I 
haven‟t seen him since then.  But I tell you, you feel really great to see a former boss of yours 
having a unique role in American politics; the kind of guy that Clinton called to for Ireland and 
the Middle East.  In fact I remember I went to Ireland, I bet it was a month after he negotiated 
the deal, the Easter Sunday Deal or whatever it was called? 
 
BW:  Good Friday. 
 
TG:  Good Friday Deal, was that what it was called?  Okay, I remember getting a free drink 
somewhere – [after] I told them I used to work for George Mitchell.  But in Ireland and then in 
the Middle East, and then now again in the Middle East, I think it just shows the unique skill set 
that he brings.  And again, I think that one of his talents that allowed him to move up in the 
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Senate was being a good listener, and I think that, if you‟re trying to deal with age-old problems 
like Ireland and the Middle East, I imagine he‟s using the same skill set there. 
 
BW:  Right.  Is there anything we‟re leaving unsaid here? 
 
TG:  Not, not really.  Like I say, it just amazes me that it‟s been twenty-five years since I left 
his staff.  So it‟s an important part of my Washington experience, I draw on it a lot, but no, I 
don‟t have anything else to offer. 
 
BW:  Well thanks very much; been a great interview. 
 
End of Interview 
